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Abstract 
Categories provide a coarse grained description of the world. A fundamental question is 
whether categories simply mirror an underlying structure of nature, or instead come 
from the complex interactions of human beings among themselves and with the 
environment. Here we address this question by modelling a population of individuals 
who co-evolve their own system of symbols and meanings by playing elementary 
language games. The central result is the emergence of a hierarchical category structure 
made of two distinct levels: a basic layer, responsible for fine discrimination of the 
environment, and a shared linguistic layer that groups together perceptions to guarantee 
communicative success. Remarkably, the number of linguistic categories turns out to be 
finite and small, as observed in natural languages. 
 
Categories are fundamental to recognize, differentiate and understand the environment. 
According to Aristotle, categories are entities characterized by a set of properties which 
are shared by their members [1]. A recent wave in cognitive science, on the other hand, 
has operated a shift in viewpoint from the object of categorization to the categorizing 
subjects [2,3]: categories are culture-dependent conventions shared by a given group. In 
this perspective, a crucial question is how they come to be accepted at a global level 
without any central coordination [4,5,6-8]. The answer has to be found in 
communication, that is the ground on which culture exerts its pressure. An established 
breakthrough in language evolution [4,9-11] is the appearance of linguistic categories, 
i.e. a shared repertoire of form-meaning associations in a given environment [2,3,5,12-
15]. Different individuals may in principle perceive, and even conceptualize, the world 
in very different ways, but they need to align their linguistic ontologies in order to 
understand each other.  
 In the past there have been many computational and mathematical studies 
addressing the learning procedures for form-meaning associations [16-17].    From the 
point of view of methodology, the evolutionary scheme, based on the maximization of 
some fitness functions, has been extensively applied [18,19]. Recent years, however, 
have shown that also the orthogonal approach of self-organisation can be fruitfully 
exploited in multi-agent models for the emergence of language [6-8]. In this context, a 
community of language users is viewed as a complex dynamical system which has to 
develop a shared communication system [20,21]. In this debate, a still open problem 
concerns the emergence of a small number of forms out of a diverging number of 
meanings. For example the few “basic colour terms”, present in natural languages, 
coarse-grain an almost infinite number of perceivable different colours [22-24]. 
Following this recent line of research, our work shows that an assembly of individuals 
with basic communication rules and without any external supervision, may evolve an 
initially empty set of categories, achieving a non-trivial communication system 
characterized by a few linguistic categories. To probe the hypothesis that cultural 
exchange is sufficient to this extent, individuals in our model are never replaced (as in 
evolutionary schemes [18,19]), the only evolution occurring in their internal form-
meaning association tables, i.e. their “mind”. The individuals play elementary language 
games [25,26] whose rules, hard-wired in individuals, constitute the only knowledge 
initially shared by the population. They are also capable of perceiving analogical stimuli 
and communicating with each others [6,7].  
 Our model involves a population of N  individuals (or players), committed in 
the categorization of a single analogical perceptual channel, each stimulus being 
represented as a real-valued number ranging in the interval ]0,1[ . Here we identify 
categorization as a partition of the interval ][0,1  in discrete sub-intervals, from now 
onwards denoted as perceptual categories [27].  Each individual has a dynamical 
inventory of form-meaning associations linking perceptual categories (meanings) to 
words (forms), representing their linguistic counterpart. Perceptual categories and words 
associated to them co-evolve dynamically through a sequence of elementary 
communication interactions, simply referred as games. All players are initialised with 
only the trivial perceptual category ][0,1 , with no name associated to it. At each time 
step a pair of individuals (one playing as speaker and the other as hearer) is selected and 
presented with a new ``scene'', i.e. a set of 2≥M  objects (stimuli), denoted as 
]0,1[∈io  with ]1,[ Mi∈ . The speaker discriminates the scene and names one object and 
the hearer tries to guess the named object. A correct guess makes the game successful. 
Based on game's outcomes both individuals update their category boundaries and the 
inventory of the associated words. A detailed description of the game is given in Fig. 1. 
The perceptive resolution power of the individuals limits their ability to distinguish 
objects/stimuli that are too close to each other in the perceptual space: in order to take 
this into account, we define a threshold mind , inversely proportional to their resolution 
power. In a given scene the M stimuli are chosen to be at a distance larger than this 
threshold, i.e. minji d|>oo| −  for every pair j)(i, . Nevertheless, objects presented in 
different games may be closer than mind . The way stimuli are randomly chosen 
characterizes the kind of simulated environment: simulations will be presented both 
with a homogeneous environment (uniform distribution in ]0,1[ ) and more natural 
environments (e.g., without loss of generality [27], the distributions of the hue sampled 
from pictures portraying natural landscapes).  
A resume of the main results of our experiments is given in Fig. 2. The evolution of the 
population presents two main stages: 1) a phase where players do not understand each 
other, followed by 2) a phase where communication has reached full success thanks to 
the emergence of a common language, still with evolving perceptual categories. The 
first phase is marked by the growth and decline of synonymy, see Fig. 2a. Synonymy, in 
 Fig.1: Rules of the game. A pair of examples representing a failure (game 1) and a success 
(game 2), respectively. In a game, two players are randomly selected from the population. Two 
objects are presented to both players. The speaker selects the topic. In game 1 the speaker 
has to discriminate the chosen topic (“a” in this case) by creating a new boundary in her 
rightmost perceptual category at the position ( ) 2/b+a . The two new categories inherit the 
words-inventory of the parent perceptual category (here the words “green” and “olive”) along 
with a different brand new word each (“brown” and “blue”). Then the speaker browses the list of 
words associated to the perceptual category containing the topic. There are two possibilities: if a 
previous successful communication has occurred with this category, the last winning word is 
chosen; otherwise the last created word is selected.  In the present example the speaker 
chooses the word “brown”, and transmits it to the hearer. The outcome of the game is a failure 
since the hearer does not have the word “brown” in her inventory. The speaker unveils the topic, 
in a non-linguistic way (e.g. pointing at it), and the hearer adds the new word to the word 
inventory of the corresponding category. In game 2 the speaker chooses the topic “a”,  finds the 
topic already discriminated and verbalizes it using the word “green” (which, for example, may be 
the winning word in the last successful communication concerning that category). The hearer 
knows this word and therefore points correctly to the topic. This is a successful game: both the 
speaker and the hearer eliminate all competing words for the perceptual category containing the 
topic, leaving “green” only. In general when ambiguities are present (e.g. the hearer finds the 
verbalized word associated to more than one category containing an object), these are solved 
making an unbiased random choice.  
 
the context of the ``naming game'' (an individual object to be named), has been already 
studied [8], and a similar evolution was observed and explained. All individuals, when 
necessary, create new words with zero probability of repetition: this leads to an initial 
growth of the vocabulary associated to each perceptual category. New words are spread 
through the population in later games and, whenever a word is understood by both 
players, other competing words for the same category are forgotten. This eventually 
leads to only one word per category. During the growth of the dictionary the success 
rate, see Fig. 2b, is very small. The subsequent reduction of the dictionary corresponds 
to a growing success rate which reaches its maximum value after synonymy has 
disappeared. In all our numerical experiments the final success rate overcomes  80% 
and in most of them goes above 90%, weakly increasing with the final number of 
perceptual categories. Success is reached in a number of games per player of the order 
of 210⋅5 , logarithmically depending on N , and it remains constant hereafter. 
The set of perceptual categories of each individual follows a somewhat different 
evolution (see dashed lines in Fig. 2c). The first step of each game is, in fact, the 
discrimination stage where the speaker (possibly followed by the hearer) may refine her 
category inventory in order to distinguish the topic from the other objects. The growth 
of the number of perceptual categories percn  of each individual is limited by the 
resolution power: in a game two objects cannot appear at a distance smaller than 
mind and therefore minperc d<n /2 . The minimal distance also imposes a minimum 
number of categories mind/1 that an individual must create before her discrimination 
process may stop. The average number of perceptual categories per individual, having 
passed mind/1 , grows sub-logarithmically and for many practical purposes it can be 
considered constant. 
 The success rate is expected to depend on the alignment of the category 
inventory among different individuals. The degree of alignment of category boundaries  
is measured by an overlap function O  (defined in the Appendix) which returns a value 
proportional to the degree of alignment of the two category inventories, reaching its 
maximum unitary value when they exactly coincide. Its study, see dashed curves of  
 Fig.2: Results of the simulations with 100=N and different values of mind : 
a) Synonymy, i.e. average number of words per category; b) Success rate 
measured as the fraction of successful games  in a sliding time windows 1000  
games long;  c) Average number of perceptual (dashed lines) and linguistic 
(solid lines) categories per individual; d) Averaged overlap, i.e. alignment 
among players, for perceptual (dashed curves) and linguistic (solid curves) 
categories. 
 
Fig. 2d, shows that alignment grows with time and saturates to a value which is, 
typically, in between 60%-70%, i.e. quite smaller than the communicative success. This 
observation immediately poses a question: given such a strong misalignment among 
individuals, why is communication so effective?   
 
  
 Fig.3: Saturation in the number of linguistic categories: a) A “word 
contagion” phenomenon occurs whenever the topic falls in a gap between two 
misaligned categories of two playing individuals. In the shown examples two 
individuals play two successive games. In game 1 the speaker (S) says “blue” 
and the hearer (H), unable to understand, adds “blue” as a possible word for her 
leftmost category; successively (game 2) the speaker repeats “blue” and the 
hearer learns this word as the definitive name for that perceptual category; both 
left and right perceptual categories of the hearer are now identified by the same 
name “blue” and they can be considered (for the purpose of communication) as 
a single linguistic category; b) Final number of linguistic categories as a function 
of mind  at different times, with 100=N . As the time increases the number of 
linguistic categories saturates. At large times, for small mind  , the number of 
linguistic categories becomes independent of mind  itself.  Concerning size 
dependence, only a weak (logarithmic) dependence on N, not shown, is 
observed. 
 
The answer has to be found in the analysis of polysemy, i.e. the existence of perceptual 
categories identified by the same unique word. Misalignment, in fact, induces a ``word 
contagion'' phenomenon. With a small but non zero probability, two individuals with 
similar, but not exactly equal, category boundaries, may play a game with a topic falling 
in a misalignment gap, as represented in Fig. 3a. In this way a word is copied to an 
adjacent perceptual category and, through a second occurrence of a similar event, may 
become the unique name of that category.  Interfering events may occur in between: it is 
always possible, in fact, that a game is played with a topic object falling in the bulk of 
the category, where both players agree on its old name, therefore cancelling the 
contagion. With respect to this cancelling probability, some gaps are too small and act 
as almost perfectly aligned boundaries, drastically reducing the probability of any 
further contagion. Thus, polysemy needs a two-step process to emerge, and a global 
self-organised agreement to become stable. On the other hand, polysemy guarantees 
communicative success: perceptual categories that are not perfectly aligned tend to have 
the same name, forming true linguistic categories, much better aligned among different 
individuals. The topmost curve of Fig. 2d, displays the overlap function measured 
considering only boundaries between categories with different names: it is shown to 
reach a much higher value, even larger than 90%.  
The appearance of linguistic categories is the evidence of a coordination of the 
population on a higher hierarchical level: a superior linguistic structure on top of the 
individual-dependent, finer, discrimination layer. The linguistic level emerges as totally 
self-organised and is the product of the (cultural) negotiation process among the 
individuals.  The average number of linguistic categories per individual, lingn , Fig. 2c 
(solid curves), grows together with catn during the first stage (where communicative 
success is still lacking), then decreases and stabilises to a much lower value. Some 
configurations of both category layers, at a time such that the success rate has overcome 
95%, are presented in Fig. 4, using different sets of external stimuli.  
The analysis, resumed in Fig.3b, of the dependence of lingn  on mind  for different 
times, makes our findings robust and, to our knowledge, unprecedented. As the 
resolution power is increased, i.e. as mind is diminished, the asymptotic number of 
linguistic categories becomes less and less dependent upon mind  itself. Most 
importantly, even if any state with 1>nling   is not stable, we have the clear evidence of 
a saturation with time, in close resemblance with metastability in glassy systems 
[28,29]. This observation allows to give a solution to the long-standing problem of 
explaining the finite (and small) number of linguistic categories lingn . In previous 
pioneering approaches [6,7] the number of linguistic categories lingn  was trivially 
constrained (with a small range of variability) by mind , with a relation of the kind 
minling dn /1∝ , implying a divergence of lingn  with the resolution power. In our model 
we have a clear indication of a finite lingn  even in the continuum limit, i.e. 0→mind , 
corresponding to an infinite resolution power.  
 
Fig.4: Categories and the pressure of environment. Inventories of 10 
individuals randomly picked up in a population of 100=N players, with 
0.01=dmin , after 710  games. For each player the configuration of perceptual 
(small vertical lines) and linguistic (long vertical lines) category boundaries is 
superimposed to a coloured histogram indicating the relative frequency of 
stimuli. The labels indicate the unique word associated to all perceptual 
categories forming each linguistic category. Three cases are presented: one 
with uniformly distributed stimuli (a) and two with stimuli randomly extracted 
from the hue distribution of natural pictures (b and c). One can appreciate the 
perfect agreement of category names, as well as the good alignment of 
linguistic category boundaries. Moreover, linguistic categories tend to be more 
refined in regions where stimuli are more frequent: an example of how the 
environment may influence the categorization process.  
 
With the help of an extensive and systematic series of simulations we have shown that a 
simple negotiation scheme, based on memory and feedback, is sufficient to guarantee 
the emergence of a self-organised communication system which is able to discriminate 
objects in the world, requiring only a small set of words. Individuals alone are endowed 
with the ability of forming perceptual categories, while cultural interaction among them 
is responsible for the emergence and alignment of linguistic categories. Our model 
reproduces a typical feature of natural languages: despite a very high resolution power, 
the number of linguistic categories is very small. For instance, in many human 
languages, the number of “basic colour terms” used to categorize colours usually 
amounts to about ten [22-24], while the light spectrum resolution power of our eyes is 
evidently much higher. Note that in our simulations we observe a reduction, with time, 
of the number of linguistic categories toward the final plateau. The experimental 
evidence [30], collected in empirical studies on colour categorization, of a  growth of 
the number of categories from simpler to more complex societies could be, in our 
opinion, an effect of the increased number N of players involved in the communicative 
process. Finally we believe that these results could be important both from the point of 
view of language evolution theories, possibly leading to a quantitative comparison with 
real data (e.g. different populations sizes and ages), and from the point view of 
applications (e.g. emergence of new communication systems in biological, social and 
technological contexts  [31,32]). 
 Appendix 
The degree of alignment of category boundaries is measured by the following ``overlap'' 
O  function: 
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where cl lc  is the width of category c , ic iic  is one of the categories of the i -th player, and 
ijc  is the generic category of the category ``intersection'' set obtained considering all the 
boundaries of both players i and j . The function ijo  returns a value proportional to the 
degree of alignment of the two category inventories, reaching its maximum unitary 
value when they exactly coincide. 
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